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KATRINA AND POWER IN AMERICA
PETER DREIER
Occidental College
The Katrina disaster exposed the major fault lines of American society and politics: class and
race. It offers lessons for urban scholars and practitioners. Katrina was a human-made disaster
more than a natural disaster. The conditions that led to the disaster, and the response by govern-
ment officials, were the result of policy choices. Government incompetence was an outgrowth of
a more serious indifference to the plight of cities and the poor. As a result, the opportunity to
reconstruct New Orleans as part of a bold regional renewal plan was lost. Whatever positive
things happen in Katrina’s aftermath will be due, in large measure, to the long-term work of
grassroots community and union-organizing groups who mobilized quickly to provide a voice
for the have-nots and who found allies among professionals to help formulate alternative plans to
those developed by business and political elites.
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A few days after Katrina struck New Orleans, President George W. Bush
told the press that the relationship between the federal, state, and local gov-
ernments is “an important relationship, and I need to understand how it works
better” (Bush 2005).
New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin, desperate and frustrated, was a bit more
straightforward in his assessment of how federalism works in practice: “I don’t
know whether it’s the governor’s problem,” he said, “I don’t know whether
it’s the president’s problem. But somebody needs to get their ass on a plane
and sit down, the two of them, and figure this out” (“Mayor to Feds” 2005).
But long before Katrina hit the city, New Orleans residents—and their
counterparts in other cities around the country—already knew that the fed-
eral government had abandoned them. The president’s response to the disas-
ter simply put his indifference to the plight of cities in dramatic relief.
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NEW ORLEANS’S RACE AND CLASS FAULT LINES
Katrina was not an equal opportunity disaster. In Heat Wave: A Social
Autopsy of Disaster in Chicago, sociologist Eric Klinenberg (2002) reveals
how that city’s economic and social divisions were reflected in who died and
who survived in a severe heat wave in July 1995. The poor, people of color,
and the elderly—those most likely to be socially isolated and without
resources—were the most likely to die.
Likewise, in New Orleans, the poorest neighborhoods were hit hardest by
the hurricane. The Bush administration apparently assumed that people
would evacuate New Orleans on their own, without giving much thought to
who these people were, what resources they had, or where they would go.
They acted as if everyone had an SUV full of gas and family or friends (or a
second home) waiting to take them in somewhere safe.
In late August, the Census Bureau released two reports (Fronzcek 2005;
DaNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Lee 2005) revealing that Mississippi (with a
21.6% poverty rate) and Louisiana (19.4%) are the nation’s poorest states.
New Orleans (with a 23.2% poverty rate) is the twelfth-poorest city in the
nation. Its median household income in 2000 was only $27,133. Only 46.5%
of its households own their own homes—one of the lowest big-city home-
ownership rates in the South. Of the city’s African-Americans, 35% do not
own a car, compared with 15% of Whites.
While most Southern cities gained population since the 1960s, New
Orleans declined like a rustbelt city. It reached its peak population, 627,525,
in 1960. Between 1990, when it had 496,939 people, and 2000, with 484,674,
it lost 2.5% of its population, while Louisiana grew by 5.9%. By 2004, it
declined another 4.6%, to 462,269. Despite declining population, murders
increased from 158 (32.6 per 100,000) in 1999 to 274 in 2003 (56.5 per
100,000). (“New Orleans,” n.d.)
From 1980 through 2003, New Orleans lost more than 50,000 jobs (from
339,953 to 279,056). During that period, oil and gas prices dropped. The
city’s port lost business to Miami and Houston. Several major companies
with headquarters in the city left town. By 2000, only one Fortune 500 firm—
the city’s power company—remained. Tourism, a low-wage industry whose
major employers, such as hotel chains, are headquartered elsewhere,
increased its importance as a source of jobs. The New Orleans area saw a
faster exodus of jobs, as well as middle-class and wealthy families, to the sub-
urbs than in other metropolitan areas, exacerbating the city’s fiscal crisis.
(“Katrina: Issues and the Aftermath” 2005)
New Orleans is not only one of the nation’s poorest cities, but also among
the most ghettoized. Among the nation’s 100 largest metro areas, it ranks
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third in poverty concentration. In 2000, 23% of the poor in metro New
Orleans lived in high-poverty neighborhoods (where at least 40% of the pop-
ulation live below the poverty line) (Pettit and Kingsley 2003).
Housing discrimination and the concentration of government-subsidized
housing have contributed to the city’s economic and racial segregation. Over
two-thirds of New Orleans residents, but only one-fifth of suburban resi-
dents, are African-American. New Orleans ranked among the nation’s most
racially segregated urban areas. The metro area’s dissimilarity index in 2000
was 69—meaning that 69% of Blacks would have to move to achieve an
equal distribution of Blacks and Whites in every neighborhood (“Sortable
List of Dissimilarity Scores” 2005).
INCOMPETENCE OR INDIFFERENCE?
Culturally, New Orleans is a unique city. But its economic and social con-
ditions parallel those in most U.S. cities. Since World War II, federal housing
and highway policies, the practices of private businesses (particularly devel-
opers, banks, and insurance companies), and local zoning and tax laws have
combined to promote middle-class flight, racial and economic segregation,
and chronic fiscal problems in America’s cities. Federal assistance to
improve urban conditions have fluctuated depending on who controls the
White House and Congress, but even with Democrats in charge urban aid has
been dwarfed by policies that subsidize and encourage the flight of employ-
ers and middle-class residents from cities (Dreier, Mollenkopf, and
Swanstrom 2005).
During the second half of the 1990s, economic and social conditions
improved, due largely to an unprecedented national economic expansion,
reinforced by federal policies that reduced unemployment, spurred produc-
tivity, lifted the working poor out of poverty (such as the Earned Income Tax
Credit and a minimum wage increase), and targeted private investment (stim-
ulated in part by stronger enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act)
to low-income urban areas. Since 2001, the indicators of urban revival—such
as reductions in unemployment, poverty, crime, the number of families with-
out health insurance, and the number of families paying more than they can
afford for housing—reversed direction (Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom
2005).
It is not difficult to understand why Bush has paid so little attention to New
Orleans (before and after Katrina) and to urban America in general. In 2000
and 2004, Al Gore and John Kerry beat Bush among urban voters by wide
margins. Bush’s first Department of Housing and Urban Development
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(HUD) Secretary, Mel Martinez, told the Washington Post that “Housing
issues are predominantly local issues . . . . The solution to meeting the
nation’s affordable housing needs will not come out of Washington” (Broder
2002, p. B7). Testifying before Congress in 2004 to justify proposed cuts for
housing assistance, Bush’s next HUD Secretary, Alphonso Jackson, claimed
that, “being poor is a state of mind, not a condition” (Washington 2004, 5A).1
Both comments reveal the Bush administration’s underlying view that urban
problems are not really federal responsibilities and that poverty is due
primarily to character flaws among the poor.
Conservative pundits and politicians have characterized Bush’s mishan-
dling of the disaster as the inherent inefficiency of “big government.” But
government—whether big or small—can be competent or incompetent. In
fact, the federal government has a reasonably good track record of respond-
ing to so-called “natural” disasters like earthquakes, floods, and hurricanes.
Remnick (2005) described how President Lyndon Johnson quickly and com-
petently responded to Hurricane Betsy, a major hurricane that struck New
Orleans in September 1965. More recently, the Clinton Administration sig-
nificantly professionalized and improved the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency (FEMA), appointed an experienced administrator (James
Whitt), increased its budget, and developed close working relationships with
governors, mayors, and their disaster management agencies. The Clinton
Administration’s success in overseeing relief and reconstruction after the
1994 Los Angeles earthquake suggests that the federal government can act
effectively and efficiently in times of crisis (Dreier and Rothstein 1994).
The Bush administration’s actions might better be characterized as indif-
ference rather than incompetence. It was a natural outgrowth of its funda-
mental hostility to government itself. A central tenet of conservative ideol-
ogy is that government interferes with individual liberty, is less efficient than
the private sector, and in many cases is simply unnecessary. Even so, many
contemporary conservatives argue that (with the exception of military spend-
ing) we need to “starve the beast,” mostly by reducing taxes (especially for
the wealthy) so much that government in general, and the federal government
in particular, will be virtually paralyzed (Krugman 2003).
As Americans saw on TV, Katrina revealed that when needed most, gov-
ernment was paralyzed.
We do not know the magnitude of the Bush administration’s blunders and
misjudgments, or their cost in human lives and property damage. What is
clear is that its indifference toward New Orleans began long before Katrina
struck. It cut the budget for FEMA and the Army Corps of Engineers. It
folded FEMA into the Department of Homeland Security, diminishing its
role as an emergency planning and relief agency while viewing it as simply
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another part of the administration’s “war on terror.” It failed to invest ade-
quately in the infrastructure needed to prevent severe hurricane damage in
New Orleans and Mississippi. The Bush administration was extremely slow
in providing relief after the hurricane struck. In late October—two months
after Katrina struck—at least 20,000 public school students from Louisiana
(mostly from New Orleans) who were uprooted by the hurricane were still
not attending any school. About 200,000 evacuees remained in hotels, while
only 7,308 temporary trailers and 10,940 housing units had been occupied by
victims in the three affected states. Many Medicaid recipients were unable to
get benefits in their new locations (Lipton 2005).
CRONY CAPITALISM AND DISASTER PROFITEERS
Bush has been justly faulted for his failure of leadership and his mishan-
dling of the nuts and bolts of the Katrina relief effort. But on several matters
involving posthurricane reconstruction, Bush was exceedingly decisive. The
administration’s failure to adequately prepare for Katrina, and then its’
botching of the evacuation and relief effort, was not simply a matter of hiring
the wrong people for the job. Indeed, Bush used the Katrina disaster as a pre-
text for the administration’s crony capitalism, corporate agenda, and
disregard for the urban poor.
Post-Katrina, the Bush administration sought to enact conservative poli-
cies that it could not get through Congress under normal circumstances. Bush
dusted off several free-market approaches—such as a “Gulf Opportunity
Zone” (tax breaks for small businesses)—that have failed in the past (Vieth
2005). It lifted the requirement that contractors have affirmative-action plans.
It proposed allowing the Environmental Protection Agency to waive environ-
mental regulations, including provisions of the Clean Air Act, during the
rebuilding. It promoted the use of school vouchers for children of Katrina
evacuees. It rescinded rules governing the number of hours truckers can work.2
Many Republicans in Congress demanded that any supplemental funds to
provide relief to Katrina’s victims—now likely to cost more than $100 bil-
lion—be offset with budget cuts rather than tax increases. Only a few weeks
after Katrina hit, Congressional Republicans called for over $50 billion in
spending cuts, most from programs for the poor, such as Medicaid, food
stamps, child care support, the earned-income tax credit, and Supplemental
Security Income. Even so, Bush and the GOP leaders in Congress, including
majority leader Senator Bill Frist, still want to adopt a $70 billion tax cut,
mostly for the very rich (Sanger and Andrews 2005).
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Bush decisively suspended federal rules to allow FEMA and the Army
Corps of Engineers to extend no-bid contracts to corporations engaged in
rebuilding. Companies with close political ties went to the front of the line.
Bush then sweetened these contracts by suspending the federal Davis-Bacon
Act, which requires federal contractors to pay local “prevailing wages” on
construction projects. (In late October, after enormous public criticism of
these actions, Bush reversed both decisions.)
Even Jack Kemp, the conservative HUD secretary under the first Presi-
dent Bush, criticized Bush’s approach: “There has to be some federal leader-
ship here,” Kemp said. “Laissez-faire, Darwinian capitalism is not going to
work. Markets do work, but they need the direction of government in situa-
tions like this” (Gosselin 2005).
Katrina is a disaster for the people of the gulf region and for the nation’s
economy. About 400,000 Americans will lose their jobs, according to the
Congressional Budget Office (Gruber 2005). But for some companies, espe-
cially those with political connections, Katrina—like the war in Iraq — is a
bonanza.
The reconstruction of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast unleashed a feed-
ing frenzy of government contracts. FEMA and the Army Corps of Engineers
(ACE) quickly suspended rules in order to allow no-bid contracts and speed
up reconstruction.
Three companies—the Shaw Group, Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR, a
subsidiary of Haliburton, whose former CEO is Vice President Dick
Cheney), and Boh Brothers Construction of New Orleans—quickly scooped
up no-bid ACE contracts to perform the restoration. Bechtel and Fluor (also
with close GOP ties) also reaped huge contracts. The Department of Defense
has been criticized for awarding Iraq reconstruction contracts to Haliburton
and Bechtel without competition (Broder 2005).
As the New York Times reported, “From global engineering and construc-
tion firms like the Fluor Corporation and Haliburton, to local trash removal
and road-building concerns, the private sector is poised to reap a windfall of
business in the largest domestic rebuilding effort ever undertaken” (Broder
2005: A1).
According to the Los Angeles Times (Miller and Silverstein 2005), lobby-
ists representing energy, transportation, and other corporate sectors domi-
nated the task forces created by Louisiana Senators David Vitter (a Republi-
can) and Mary Landrieu (a Democrat) to advise them in drafting the
Louisiana Katrina Reconstruction Act. The legislation included “billions of
dollars’ worth of business for clients of those lobbyists” (Miller and
Silverstein 2005: A1).
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Bush’s first FEMA director, Joseph Allbaugh, resigned in 2003 to head
New Bridge Strategies, a firm whose Web site boasts it is “a unique company
that was created specifically with the aim of assisting clients to evaluate and
take advantage of business opportunities in the Middle East following the
conclusion of the U.S.–led war in Iraq.” Allbaugh used his connections to
help his clients, including KBR, win post-Katrina contracts, including a U.S.
Navy contract to, according to the Houston Chronicle, “restore electric
power, repair roofs and remove debris at three naval facilities in Mississippi
damaged by Hurricane Katrina” and to “perform damage assessments at
other naval installations in New Orleans as soon as it is safe to do so”
(“Around the Region” 2005: 3).
Compounding this crony capitalism, Bush suspended the Davis-Bacon
law for Katrina-damaged areas of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, and Missis-
sippi. Enacted in 1931, it sets a minimum pay scale for workers on federal
contracts by requiring contractors to pay each region’s prevailing wages. The
prevailing wage for a carpenter is about $12 an hour in New Orleans and $7
an hour in Gulfport, Mississippi, both far below the national average
(Eisenbrey 2005).
The Bush administration, Congressional Republicans, and their corporate
allies have long opposed the Davis-Bacon law. During the 2004 election
cycle, the construction industry donated $71 million to candidates for the
White House and Congress. According to the Center for Responsive Politics,
a nonpartisan watchdog group, 72% of those contributions went to Republi-
cans (“Your Guide to Money in U.S. Elections” 2005). They used Katrina to
impose their agenda through the back door.
The suspension of Davis-Bacon was an open invitation to employers to
pay low wages to people desperate for jobs. The Gulf Coast and New
Orleans—which prior to Katrina had a tiny (3.1%) Latino population—saw
an influx of Mexican and Central American immigrants, many of them
undocumented, lured by the boom in construction work and service-sector
jobs previously filled by residents who had evacuated the region. Most
employers pay them far below prevailing wages; some failed to pay at all.
Many of these immigrants had to live in overcrowded conditions.
WHO WILL RULE THE NEW NEW ORLEANS?
To Americans watching events unfold on TV or by reading newspapers
and news magazines, the Katrina disaster revealed the meltdown of New
Orleans’s local government. Mayor Nagin appeared angry but helpless.
Many of his police department’s officers failed to report for duty,
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undermining the city’s ability to protect lives and property. A handful of cops
were even seen looting local retail stores. Patients at the private Tulane Uni-
versity hospital were quickly removed, while patients at the municipally run
Charity Hospital were left for days to fend for themselves (Sternberg 2005).
The city government had no evacuation plan in place before the disaster
struck. While the White House and the federal EPA disagreed about whether
the region’s water was safe to drink, Nagin first urged people to return, then
told them to stay away. To the casual observer, New Orleans’s municipal gov-
ernment fit the worst stereotypes about urban politics.
In truth, no municipal government has the capacity to handle a disaster of
Katrina’s magnitude. Only the federal government has the resources to deal
with the prevention, rescue, and rebuilding of areas faced with major disas-
ters. For certain, the city government had a role to play. But New Orleans,
even more than most cities, faced chronic fiscal problems, because so many
of its residents are poor and so much of its economy is based on low-wage
jobs. Because Louisiana is a right-to-work state, New Orleans lacks a strong
local labor movement, which is often a key player in municipal politics
elsewhere.
Occasionally, inchoate class conflicts surface in the political arena. For
example, in 2002, New Orleans ACORN (a community organizing group)
and the Service Employees International Union (SEIU) waged a grassroots
campaign to get the city to adopt a municipal minimum wage that was $1 over
the federal level, and would apply only to businesses with over $500,000 in
revenues. The referendum passed with support from 63% of the voters. The
law would have benefited about 70,000 low-income workers, mostly Afri-
can-Americans, mostly employed in the tourism industry. After the vote,
however, the region’s business groups, which had led the opposition to the
proposal, successfully filed suit in Louisiana Supreme Court to uphold a state
law, passed a few years earlier, to pre-empt local minimum wage ordinances,
overturning the people’s will (Finch 2002; Pollin, Brenner, and Luce 2002;
Yerton 2002).
In the wake of Katrina, class and race struggles will again rise to the sur-
face. Which local stakeholders will play important roles in how federal funds
are allocated for rebuilding the city, who will receive the funds, and how
those funds will be used?
Although the Bush administration would prefer to circumvent state and
local government (both run by Democrats) as well as local community and
labor groups, and make most of these decisions without their input, Bush
cannot simply ignore local players. National corporations and local busi-
nesses with close ties to the Bush Administration (and, in Mississippi, to
Governor Haley Barbour, former Republican National Committee head)—as
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well as with the Congressional delegation, the governor, and the mayor—will
have an advantage in shaping the agenda and getting federal reconstruction
funds.
The New York Times (Rivlin 2005a and 2005b) profiled several such play-
ers. One is Joseph C. Canizaro, a major New Orleans developer who had been
a big Bush fundraiser, is close to Mayor Nagin, and in 2000 created the Com-
mittee for a Better New Orleans (CBNO), which brought together more than
100 business and civic leaders to address the city’s problems. Canizaro
played a key role in helping Nagin pick the 17-member blue-ribbon task
force to make recommendations on rebuilding the city. Another task force
member, Donald Bollinger, is head of Bollinger Shipyards (based in nearby
Lockport, Mississippi), is close to Bush and other Republicans, served as
chair of the local United Way, and was president of CBNO.
Who speaks for New Orleans’s poor, the people whose neighborhoods
were hardest hit, who lost their jobs and their health insurance, and who are
not represented on Mayor Nagin’s commission?
One problem in answering this question is that more than one million New
Orleans and Gulf Coast residents fled the region and now live in Baton
Rouge, Houston, Jackson, and elsewhere. Many of their New Orleans houses
and apartments may be uninhabitable. Their neighborhoods may be toxic
health hazards for some time. Their old jobs may no longer exist, at least in
the short-term.
How will the state and city deal with displaced voters? Will they retain
their right to vote as Louisiana and New Orleans residents, even if they do not
return for six months or a year? Or will state and local politicians try to
remove them from the voting rolls? Even if they remain on the voting lists,
will the local politicians make a serious effort to find them and provide them
with absentee ballots? Will there even be a public debate and struggle over
these issues?
The Katrina exodus could dramatically shift the balance of power in Loui-
siana and New Orleans. Governor Blanco’s 2003 election victory and Sena-
tor Mary Landrieu’s (D-Louisiana) 2002 reelection win had margins of fewer
than 60,000 votes. Overwhelming support from African-Americans consti-
tuted much of those margins (Fletcher and Hsu 2005).
Mayor Nagin and the entire City Council is up for re-election in February
2006. As the Washington Post noted: “The election will be one of the most
important in the city’s history, with the winners set to play a pivotal role in
deciding how the city will be rebuilt. But with only a smattering of the city’s
484,000 residents back home, it will also be an election in which voters will
be difficult to find and residency hard to prove, leaving candidates unsure of
how to campaign” (Fletcher and Hsu 2005: A7).
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Public officials will focus primarily on the concerns of businesses and the
affluent unless the poor and near-poor are mobilized to make demands and
participate in elections. The major media have generally portrayed New
Orleans-area residents as helpless victims, grateful for any handout from the
Red Cross, FEMA, or other charities and government agencies.
The mainstream media virtually ignored the efforts of several commu-
nity-organizing groups to mobilize residents of New Orleans, as well as
among the evacuees living in Houston, Baton Rouge, and elsewhere, to gain a
voice in the post-Katrina deliberations. The three national organizing net-
works—ACORN, IAF, and PICO—immediately began sending their local
organizers to the Superdome in New Orleans, the Astrodome in Houston, and
other emergency shelters, talking with evacuees about their immediate and
longer-term needs. They worked with churches, unions, community groups,
and their own local members to find survivors and help them find emergency
relief, housing, jobs, and other basic needs (Blumenthal 2005; Casey 2005;
Hall 2005; Klein 2005; Riccardi and Zucchino 2005; Stiles 2005; Tisserand
2005).
ACORN, which has chapters in 75 cities around the country, organized the
Katrina Survivors Association to give residents, including those who fled to
other communities, a voice. Soon after Katrina hit, ACORN—whose
national headquarters was located in New Orleans—began contacting mem-
bers in over 35 cities who had escaped Katrina. It held meetings of survivors
to distribute recovery information and began making demands on govern-
ment officials, winning a number of important victories. In Dallas, for exam-
ple, ACORN members marched on the mayor’s office to protest the city’s
refusal to work with FEMA to provide housing for evacuees. After two
weeks of public pressure, FEMA developed a plan to provide housing
directly to survivors. On October 15, ACORN members staged a caravan into
the Lower Ninth Ward to claim their right to return, posting “Do Not Bull-
doze” signs on homes. In October, New Orleans ACORN, the Louisiana
AFL-CIO, the Louisiana NAACP, and SEIU locals organized a march and
rally in Baton Rouge to demand a resident voice in rebuilding. A delegation
of ACORN’s Katrina survivors traveled to Washington, D.C., where they met
with Congressional leadership, held a rally at FEMA, and joined Senator Ted
Kennedy in introducing the Rebuild and Respect Act, which embodies many
of the rebuilding principles they have been fighting for. In November,
ACORN organized a meeting at Louisiana State University that brought
together its leaders, staff, and two dozen planners, housing developers, and
economists to develop a comprehensive plan for post-Katrina reconstruction.
Soon after Katrina struck, Houston Mayor Bill White immediately invited
The Metropolitan Organization (TMO), a well-regarded community-organizing
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group affiliated with the Industrial Areas Foundation, to participate in the
city’s efforts to deal with the tens of thousands of new residents in terms of
health care, housing, education, and other needs. TMO’s organizers and lead-
ers organized meetings in local churches where survivors voiced their com-
plaints and made demands in front of local officials, including the mayor,
FEMA, and the Red Cross. TMO formed its own organization of residents and
gathered thousands of signatures among evacuees to demand better treat-
ment, especially for children, the elderly, and those in need of medical help.
The PICO organizing network sponsored a meeting of 1,000 refugees
from New Orleans held in Baton Rouge in early October. Governor Blanco
came and signed PICO’s “reconstruction covenant.”
WHAT KIND OF RECONSTRUCTION?
While the rescue and resettlement of Katrina’s victims was just beginning,
government officials and business leaders were already formulating recon-
struction plans. The federal government approved more than $100 billion for
hurricane relief and repair, the largest urban (and rural) renewal program in
memory.
Will these funds be used primarily to provide a financial bonanza to politi-
cally connected corporations and developers? Or will they be used to help
create strong and healthy communities that will do more than restore what
was there before but will improve economic, social, and environmental con-
ditions for the people who live and work there?
The answer to these questions depends in large measure on whether the
residents of the region have a strong voice in shaping the rebuilding process.
Through their community organizations, religious congregations, labor
unions, and civic groups, residents should play a central role in determining
how and where the money is spent. Many residents worry that the Bush
Administration, the governors, and the mayors will be influenced primarily
by corporate powerbrokers, bankers, and builders.
The Gulf Coast has half of the nation’s oil refineries. About 60% of oil
imports come through Gulf ports. Within weeks of the disaster, repair of
these facilities was underway. People also hope that much of the city’s cul-
tural life—its music venues, the French Quarter, its charming neighbor-
hoods—can be restored. But what about the rest of the city and region? The
people who return will need jobs, homes, and public services. The area will
need to rebuild hospitals, health clinics, parks, playgrounds, and schools.
Should the federal government simply subsidize the reconstruction of the
city’s low-wage economy—its hotels, casinos, and other tourist and service
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industries? If a major hotel chain or casino is going to get millions in federal
aid, should there be some quid pro quos—like requiring them to pay a living
wage or provide other community benefits?
Should the federal government provide homebuilders and landlords with
millions of dollars in federal funds to reconstruct apartment buildings without
any guarantees that rents will be affordable to the families who need them?
In rebuilding New Orleans and its suburbs, should policy makers avoid
isolating the poor in ghetto neighborhoods? In reconstructing the city’s infra-
structure, should they link where people live, work, and shop through
improved public transit?
Political constituencies will have to be mobilized—nationally as well as in
the Gulf Coast region—to ensure that New Orleans is eventually a more liv-
able place than it was before, especially for its poor. If post-Katrina recon-
struction is to proceed as a two-way street—bottom-up as well as top-
down—government policy makers should take into account some guidelines
and principles learned from previous successes and failures of urban and
metropolitan policy.
Public health. Much of the region is now a huge toxic brownfield that
could contaminate children, workers, and the elderly, producing permanent
damage. Will the Bush administration resist pressures from big business,
developers, and some residents to start putting shovels in the ground as soon
as possible? Should construction of homes, schools, businesses, and other
facilities occur before a comprehensive environmental and public health
assessment has been done, to evaluate which areas are safe and which will
require extensive environmental clean-up? Should toxic areas that endanger
public health be declared Superfund sites and federal funds allocated to
decontaminate them before people are permitted to live and work there?
Infrastructure. In New Orleans, much of the physical infrastructure—
sewers, utilities, levees, and roads—was outdated and crumbling even before
Katrina struck. In much of the rural parts of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Ala-
bama, infrastructure was primitive. Before homes, businesses, and public
facilities are constructed, should the federal government invest in infrastruc-
ture to ensure that the next hurricane does not destroy the region? Key to
making conditions more livable is developing a regional plan for public
transportation that includes bus, trolley, and automobile to limit congestion
and to provide options for families without cars.
The federal government must rebuild the city’s levee system to withstand
Category 5 hurricanes. Insurance companies, lenders, and builders will be
reluctant to invest in New Orleans—and especially its flood-prone low-
income neighborhoods—if they think the levees are not strong enough. Or, if
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they do invest in New Orleans, they will charge outrageous premiums to
consumers.
Any rebuilding effort in the region must take into account the erosion of
the wetlands. Policies that allowed developers to build in the wetlands exac-
erbated flood conditions, harming the environment, making Louisiana’s cit-
ies and towns more vulnerable to hurricane devastation.3 The rebuilding of
New Orleans needs to complement the rebuilding of the Louisiana coast,
which used to act as a land buffer to slow down and weaken hurricanes as they
came onshore. This is no longer the case, because much of Louisiana’s coast-
line has sunk into the Gulf of Mexico.
Public facilities. The region’s schools, nursing homes, hospitals, health
clinics, and child care centers need to be rebuilt. These institutions are critical
to a community’s social fabric. Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama are
among the nation’s poorest states. Their schools were already among the
most underfunded. Their populations ranked among the lowest in access to
health insurance, a situation exacerbated by the disaster, because many peo-
ple are now jobless, and the Bush administration proposed to deny Medicaid
to many Katrina victims.
Housing. More than a million people were forced to flee New Orleans and
the Gulf Coast. Many of their homes were destroyed or became uninhabit-
able and need to be razed. The New York Times reported that as many as
50,000 (out of 180,000) New Orleans homes may have to be demolished
(Nossiter 2005b). Many New Orleans residents were evacuated to “tempo-
rary” trailer parks in Baton Rouge and elsewhere. Most want to return, but
under what circumstances? Post-Katrina provides an opportunity to learn
from past mistakes and create stronger communities and neighborhoods.
Among the poor, many homes were already physically substandard. It
makes no sense to rebuild the region’s residential areas just as they were
before Katrina. In New Orleans, for example, federally subsidized housing
for the poor was concentrated in a few areas, isolating the poor in economic
and racial ghettoes. Instead, neighborhoods should include homeownership
and rental housing, market-rate homes and homes affordable to low-income
and middle-class families.
In September, Bush proposed giving away federally owned land to fami-
lies by lottery if they were willing to build new homes on the sites, under an
“urban homesteading” program (Chen and Curtius 2005). There is not
enough federal land to make this plan practical. But even if there were,
rebuilding the region one house at a time would be wasteful and inefficient.
Entire neighborhoods need to be rebuilt. Experienced nonprofit and for-
profit developers should be enlisted in this effort, guided by plans created by
local residents.
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Homeownership counseling by knowledgeable nonprofit community
groups is critical. Otherwise, people could become unwitting victims of
unscrupulous and predatory lenders and contractors, who prey on desperate
people, do shoddy construction, and charge excessive fees. This would lead
to large-scale foreclosures in a few years, as we have seen in other cities.
In areas of New Orleans, Baton Rouge, Houston, and elsewhere where
there still may be housing vacancies, HUD can provide Section 8 rental
vouchers to evacuees.
But something must be done to restrain the greed of speculators, who
within days of Katrina were buying up properties throughout the region to
take advantage of the housing shortage and of the federally subsidized
bonanza. To limit price gouging during this emergency, we need temporary
rent control or a freeze on real estate transactions until a rebuilding plan is in
place. Soon after the hurricane hit, Governor Blanco announced an emer-
gency ban on evictions for tenants who had fled their homes. But under pres-
sure from the Greater New Orleans Apartment Association, Blanco lifted the
ban less than a month later (Nossiter 2005a).
The state of Louisiana could create a nonprofit building supplies and
materials cooperative to negotiate with suppliers and purchase building
materials (lumber, tools, cement, bricks, even home appliances) at a dis-
count. The cooperative would have enormous leverage over building suppli-
ers, using the economies of scale of large-scale purchasing. It could make
these discounted building supplies available to designated developers/con-
tractors for reconstruction. Without such an entity, the competition for build-
ing materials will lead to enormous increases in costs, making residential
reconstruction much more expensive. In this way, savings would focus on
building supplies, not labor.
Jobs. The decade-long rebuilding of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast—
plus the addition of new schools and other facilities in Houston, Baton
Rouge, and elsewhere to accommodate their local population explosions—
will generate tens of thousands of jobs, particularly in the construction of
homes, roads, infrastructure, schools, hospitals, and businesses. Who will get
those jobs and will they pay a living wage? Should local residents be given
priority for jobs rebuilding their communities? Should federal funds be tar-
geted to competent nonprofit organizations that have experience in job train-
ing so that people will have permanent skills?
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LESSONS FOR URBAN SCHOLARS AND PRACTITIONERS
The Katrina disaster could have triggered a bold social experiment. In its
wake, policy makers could have applied the lessons, learning from both suc-
cesses and failures, of past urban policy to help rebuild New Orleans and the
Gulf Coast region. More than $100 billion in federal funds alone will be tar-
geted to the city and the region for housing, schools, infrastructure, parks,
commercial districts, and transportation. Under different political circum-
stances, this could have been a remarkable moment for urban and regional
planning and policy practitioners to work collaboratively with government
officials, community groups, civic leaders, unions, and business to rebuild
the New Orleans region as a more livable and sustainable area. The missing
ingredient, however, was political will on the part of those with power—the
Bush administration, the heads of Congressional committees, and key busi-
ness leaders—to develop a common vision for the region’s future that
involved the residents and their organizations.
Some urban scholars, policy practitioners, and community activists hoped
that the Katrina disaster would catalyze a renewed interest in urban policy,
poverty, and racism. Indeed, for a few weeks after Katrina struck, these issues
were back in the news. Newspaper and magazine articles highlighted the race
and class fault lines exposed by the hurricane (Alter 2005; DeParle 2005:
Connolly 2005; Brownstein 2005a; Brownstein 2005b; Maggs 2005;
Henninger 2005; Keyssar 2005; Altman 2005; Kelman 2005).
But the public debate quickly faded as media stories began to focus on the
finger-pointing between the federal, state, and local governments and the
Bush administration’s mishandling of evacuation and relief efforts. Exagger-
ated news reports of looting by New Orleans residents reinforced the conser-
vative “blame the victim” stereotypes about urban problems.
It is instructive to compare the Katrina aftermath with the similar dynamic
that occurred after the April 1992 Los Angeles riots. For years, urban schol-
ars and activists had warned that our cities were ticking time bombs, waiting
to explode. When the riots erupted—the worst civil disorder in American his-
tory—many hoped that it would catalyze a major national commitment to
revitalize the cities—an urban Marshall Plan. The timing seemed perfect.
The riots coincided with the end of the Cold War. When the Berlin Wall fell,
and the Soviet Union collapsed, there was much public discussion about the
prospects for a “peace dividend” to reorder national priorities and address
long-unmet domestic needs. Moreover, the riots occurred in the midst of a
national election for President and Congress. For a few weeks following the
riots, America’s urban crisis became a hot topic (Dreier 1992 and 2003). But
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soon the plight of America’s cities returned to political obscurity. Pundits and
politicians were divided between conservatives, who blamed the victims for
their plight, and liberals, who called for modest increases in federal
assistance to cities and the poor.
Many urbanists hoped that Bill Clinton’s victory in November 1992
would usher in a new era of hope for the nation’s cities. His victory was
viewed as a mandate for a more activist government. But Clinton was elected
without a majority mandate. He received only 43% of the overall vote.
Equally important, his own Democratic Party, while capturing a majority of
the seats in Congress, was deeply divided, with many members closely
linked to big business interests who oppose progressive taxation, Keynesian
pump-priming, and social spending. Early in the Clinton administration,
Congress thwarted the president’s efforts to enact a modest public investment
plan, universal health insurance, and even a child immunization program.
The Republican takeover of Congress in November 1994 exacerbated the
political isolation of cities, symbolized by Clinton’s proposal a month later to
dramatically cut the HUD budget. Although urban conditions improved dur-
ing the Clinton years, the plight of our cities has not been a prominent issue in
presidential campaigns since then.
We cannot expect a major disaster—whether the Los Angeles riots or the
Katrina disaster—to trigger a national debate over cities. Disasters, acci-
dents, scandals, and other unexpected events such Watergate, Enron, and the
Santa Barbara oil spill often expose the things we take for granted (Molotch
1970). They force us to hold a mirror up to society and see it as it really is. The
public is often shocked at the human consequences of such events. They tell
pollsters that government officials need to “do something” to address the
problem. They often lead to a shift in public opinion. But these events are
rarely, on their own, catalysts for social change or major policy shifts. The
immediacy of the tragedy soon recedes and people return to business as
usual. The media soon loses interest when the political drama fades and the
mundane tasks of recovery take over. The root causes and the chronic human
suffering get pushed aside by stories about government turf battles and
bureaucratic bungling, undermining public confidence in the capacity of
government to solve problems (Dreier 2005).
What generally brings about positive change—especially for poor and
working-class people—is the slow, gradual, difficult work of union organiz-
ing, community organizing, and participation in electoral politics. To the
extent that Los Angeles is a better city today than it was ten years ago, it is due
to the grassroots activists—and their allies among foundations, media,
clergy, and public officials—who have worked in the trenches pushing for
change against difficult obstacles (Gottlieb, Freer, Vallianatos, and Dreier
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2004). Likewise, whatever positive things happen in the aftermath of Katrina
will be due, in large measure, to the long-term work of grassroots community
and union-organizing groups who mobilized quickly after the disaster struck
to provide a voice for the have-nots and who found allies among urban plan-
ning, engineering, and community-development experts to help formulate
alternative plans to those developed by business and political elites.
The debate over post-Katrina reconstruction is not about “big govern-
ment” versus “small government.” It is about “big government” for whom?
Will the main beneficiaries of federal funds be those with deep pockets and
political connections? Or will federal funds focus on the needs ordinary peo-
ple and help them to rebuild their homes, neighborhoods, jobs, and lives?
Unless those people have a voice in the decision making from the start, and
unless the rebuilding follows the principles outlined above, the new New
Orleans will look very similar (although perhaps smaller in population size,
somewhat whiter, and more gentrified) to the old New Orleans. And public
trust in government will sink even more than the levees.
In contrast to conservative ideology, the Katrina disaster reveals how
much we need government to provide things that individuals and the private
sector cannot. It is needed to build the public infrastructure necessary for a
civilized society, protect people from health, environmental, and disaster
risks, help relieve the immediate suffering, build dams, levees, bridges,
roads, and public transit as well as schools, parks, and playgrounds, and help
people and communities restore some level of normalcy and decency.
Katrina also highlights the importance of having competent government
run by well-trained people. There were plenty of competent public servants
who, given the opportunity and resources, could have prevented the disaster
and/or dramatically limited its consequences. Katrina was a failure of will by
high-ranking government leaders, not incompetence by middle-level manag-
ers and front-line staff in the military, FEMA, and other agencies.
The Katrina disaster has triggered the nation’s largest population move-
ment in memory. Some will return to their previous communities, but many
will remain where they have relocated. These cities are now faced with enor-
mous challenges. Where will these people live and work? Where will their
children attend school? How will they get health care and nursing home care?
Should the burden for addressing these human needs and economic reali-
ties fall on the localities, or be left to the private market? Or should Washing-
ton play a significant role? Will the Bush administration and Congress view
this resettlement the way it views immigration from abroad, forcing those cit-
ies and states with the vast majority of new immigrants (especially Califor-
nia, Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona) to provide for them?
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Wherever they move, the evacuees from New Orleans and Mississippi are
mostly poor. They will need jobs, housing, and health care, among other
things. But so do millions of other Americans, including the 37 million who
are poor, the 45.8 million without health insurance, the even larger number
who pay more than they can afford to put a roof over their heads (DeNavas-
Walt, Proctor, and Lee 2005). Why help the victims of Katrina but not the vic-
tims of government policies and business practices that have undermined the
American Dream for so many people?
The Katrina disaster begs the larger question: What responsibility, if any,
does the federal government have to provide Americans with decent housing,
access to health care, and opportunities for work that pays a living wage?
Should government help people cope with the vicissitudes of the business
cycle, the inequities of the market economy, and just plain bad luck?
Building majoritarian support for a renewed federal effort to help cities is
possible, but we cannot expect an event like Katrina to substitute for the hard
political work that is necessary. The United States is now a suburban nation.
More than half of all voters in presidential elections are suburbanites. We
need to forge coalitions between urban voters and sectors of the suburban
electorate that can win elections in a majority of Congressional districts. This
requires reframing the way we think about cities as parts of metropolitan
areas. It requires developing a national policy agenda that addresses issues
such as public education, housing, transportation, the environment, health
care, and others in ways that build common ground between cities and sec-
tors of suburbia.
Both suburban sprawl and concentrated urban poverty are economically
inefficient, socially unfair, and environmentally wasteful. Of course, we can-
not turn back the clock. But just as we spent trillions of federal dollars to lure
people and jobs to the suburbs, we must develop an equally ambitious plan to
improve the fiscal condition of our cities and older suburbs, to limit the eco-
nomic competition between municipalities (for the latest shopping mall or
Wal-Marts, for example) that fuels further sprawl, to reduce widening eco-
nomic disparities between the rich and poor, and to help lift the poor out of
poverty with decent jobs, adequate health care, wellfunded schools, and
access to public transit and affordable housing outside ghettos and barrios
(Dreier, Mollenkopf, and Swanstrom 2005; Rusk 1999).
Katrina unveiled the human disaster at hand as a result of several decades
of the ascendancy of right-wing ideas and corporate domination of the fed-
eral government, which extols market forces, individualism, and private
charity over public responsibility and the common good. It underscores the
need to reorder national priorities.
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NOTES
1. Jackson also triggered a controversy after Katrina struck when he said that parts of the
low-lying Ninth Ward, a mostly African-American and low-income area, may never be rebuilt.
“Whether we like it or not, New Orleans is not going to be 500,000 people for a long time,” he
said. “New Orleans is not going to be as Black as it was for a long time, if ever again” (Fletcher
and Hsu 2005: A7; Havemann 2005: A14; Axtman 2005: 1).
2. President Bush’s behavior is consistent. In the wake of the 9/11 tragedy, Bush used con-
cerns over national security as a pretext for underminingworkers’rights. His legislation sought to
strip 170,000 federal employees being transferred to the new Department of Homeland Security
of various workplace protections, including civil service regulations and collective bargaining
rights. Similarly, the legislation federalizing about 56,000 airport screeners exempted them from
union protections. Soon after 9/11, Bush also established a quota requiring government agencies
to outsource at least 425,000 (later upped to 850,000) federal jobs to private contractors (many of
which, it turns out, had contributed to his campaign). In December 2001, Bush also revoked rules
prohibiting companies with a track record of violating federal labor laws—as well as environ-
mental, consumer protection, civil rights and tax laws—from signing outsource employment
contracts with federal agencies.
3. The New Yorker (Mayer 2005) reported that, according to Carol Browner, who ran the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) during the Clinton Administration, Senator Trent Lott
of Mississippi fought EPA’s efforts to limit construction of gambling casinos on Mississippi’s
environmentally sensitive wetlands. Will, in the wake of Katrina, the developers and their politi-
cal allies heed those warnings?
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